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What do the Crimean Tatars face in 
Crimea? 
The Issue Brief concerns further developments which the Crimean Tatars may 
experience after the Russian annexation of Crimea. The Crimean Tatars are the  second 
largest minority in the Crimean peninsula, and they are represented by politically active 
movements with far-reaching claims concerning the status of Crimean Tatars and 
territorial self-determination. Within less than one month these people as well  as their 
homeland have been transferred to another country with different political and legal 
systems and potentially a less friendly social environment. Since the contours of the 
future legal and institutional framework for the accommodation of Crimean T atars are 
not fully clear, one can project the major organizational setups and patterns of Russian 
ethno-politics onto Crimea and tentatively assess their applicability. We can conclude 
that in a formal sense the Russian rule does not promise the Crimean T atars much more 
than they already had in Ukraine, but puts them at risk of a strict police control and 
pressure. Such arrangements as territorial and non -territorial autonomy, power-
sharing, ‘rehabilitation’ of the Crimean Tatars as victims of the past rep ressions may 
take place but they would have limited practical sense. Cultural programmes and 
recruitment of Crimean Tatars to the regional administration are unlikely to be legally 
guaranteed and will be fully dependent on the discretion of Russian and Cri mean 
authorities.  
 
Alexander Osipov, April 2014 
ECMI Issue Brief # 32 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
What can the Crimean Tatars
1
 expect of the new 
rule established after the Russian military 
occupation and annexation of Crimea? There are 
several reasons to pay primary attention to the 
Crimean Tatars while analyzing ethno-politics in 
the Crimean peninsula. Formally, they are the 
second largest minority within the region’s 2.5 
million-strong population being outnumbered by 
Ukrainians (if we regard Russians as the 
majority). At the same time, the Crimean Tatars 
are a people, who had been deported from their 
homeland during Soviet rule and returned back 
only 20-25 years ago, before and after  
 
the breakdown of the Soviet Union. This group 
is politically active and well organized and the 
organizations speaking on the Crimean Tatars’ 
behalf pursue far-reaching goals based on the 
claim of their exclusive status as the only 
indigenous people in the peninsula. Within 
literally one month this people has been 
transferred together with their homeland to 
another country with a different political regime, 
institutional setting and social environment, at 
least potentially hostile to the agendas and 
aspirations of the Crimean Tatars leaders. What 
can ordinary Crimean Tatars, Crimean Tatar 
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activists and all other Crimeans expect from 
these transformations? 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1. Crimea 
In 1783, the Crimean peninsula, the core of the 
Crimean Khanate, by that time predominantly 
inhabited by Crimean Tatars, was annexed by 
the Russian Empire.
2
 In 1921, after the 
Bolshevik takeover it became an autonomous 
republic within the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic, since 1922 a part of the 
USSR. In 1944 up to 200,000 Crimean Tatars 
(who constituted approximately 19% of the 
Crimean population before World War II
3
) as 
well as smaller groups of Greeks, Armenians 
and Bulgarians were deported to Soviet Central 
Asia following the German minority which had 
been forcibly relocated in 1941.
4
 In 1945 the 
peninsula lost its autonomous status, and in 1954 
was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic by decision of the USSR government. 
In January 1991, the Crimean majority voted for 
the restoration of the peninsula’s position as an 
autonomous republic within the USSR, and the 
Ukrainian Supreme Council (the republic’s 
legislature) approved this decision without 
delay. Both the Crimean and Ukrainian 
authorities acknowledged that Crimea was part 
of Ukraine, and a slight majority of the Crimean 
population approved Ukraine’s independence at 
the all-Ukrainian referendum of 1 December 
1991. Then followed a long period of political 
turbulence and strife in the relations between 
Kiev and Simferopol (the capital of Crimea), but 
the political tensions fell short from real threats 
of secession, violent clashes or escalation to 
ethnic conflict.
5
 The 1996 Constitution of 
Ukraine and the 1998 Constitution of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) secured 
the position of most of the peninsula as the only 
autonomous territory within Ukraine. The 
region’s largest city and the former Soviet naval 
base Sevastopol was subject directly to Kiev as a 
metropolitan area with a special status separate 
from ARC. 
According to the 2001 Ukrainian Census, 
the ARC population reached 2,024,000, while 
Sevastopol had 379,500 inhabitants.
6
 The largest 
ethnic group in ARC were Russians (58.5 per 
cent) followed by Ukrainians (24.4 per cent) and 
Crimean Tatars (12.3 per cent).
7
 Sevastopol is 
also predominantly Russian (71.6 per cent in 
2001). The Russian language dominates both 
ARC and Sevastopol (respectively 77.0 and 90.6 
per cent claimed that it was their native tongue
8
), 
and all analysts and policy-makers agree that 
there is no significant difference between 
Russians and Ukrainians in their linguistic, 
cultural and political preferences.
9
 In other 
words, Ukrainians are strongly assimilated and 
organizations speaking on behalf of the 
Ukrainians are small and extremely weak.  
2.2. Crimean Tatars 
Crimean Tatars were deported from Crimea in 
May 1944 to Soviet Central Asia and subjected 
to a special administrative supervision in exile. 
The relocation and the harsh living conditions in 
exile took a high death toll estimated to be from 
15 to 46 per cent of deportees.
10
 Until the late 
1980s the Crimean Tatars were not allowed to 
return to Crimea and remained scattered over 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, the Russian 
Federation as well as mainland Ukraine. The 
Crimean Tatar mass movement for return got the 
opportunity to act more or less freely in 1987, 
and since that year Crimean Tatars started to 
resettle to Crimea on their own, en masse and 
spontaneously.
11
 By March 1988 the local 
authorities in Crimea registered 17,250 
repatriates, while by January 1992 their number 
increased to 157,862 and approximately to 
200,000 in early 1994.
12
 245,200
13
 lived in the 
Crimean peninsula by 2001, and from 15,000 to 
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100,000 Crimean Tatars are estimated to stay in 
other former Soviet republics. There are also 
large diasporas in Turkey and Romania. 
In the course of return to their homeland 
the Crimean Tatars encountered huge problems 
concerning housing, employment, property, 
schooling and social security.
14
 No 
compensation or property restitution has been 
envisaged by Ukrainian law, and the housing 
programmes for the repatriates were 
insufficient.
15
 This led to illegal seizure of land 
and squatting that in turn repeatedly provoked 
tensions and even violent clashes.
16
 An 
important problem was also the citizenship 
issue. The Ukrainian legislation does not allow 
double citizenship, and while Uzbekistan 
regarded most of the repatriates as its nationals, 
denunciation of the Uzbek citizenship often 
turned out to be an insurmountable obstacle. 
Besides, residence registration is in fact a 
requirement for citizenship applications, and this 
also barred many people from naturalization in 
Ukraine. Fortunately, Uzbekistan and Ukraine 
managed to resolve the citizenship issue for 
Crimean Tatars in 1998-99 under the aegis of 
the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities and the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees.
17
 Finally, one might say that the 
repatriation process is basically over – most 
Crimean Tatars wishing to return have already 
done this. While in 1991 there were 42,800 
thousand Crimean Tatar repatriates coming to 
Crimea, in 1996 their number decreased to 
8,100.
18
  The accommodation of the repatriates 
in terms of citizenship, housing, employment 
and education is basically accomplished 
although most Crimean Tatars still belong to the 
poorest and socially deprived segment of the 
peninsula’s population.19  
The Crimean Tatars mostly live in the 
steppe areas basically in the central and eastern 
parts of the peninsula outside the most 
prosperous coastal recreational zones. They 
constitute around 12.3 and 0.5 per cent of the 
population in ARC and Sevastopol respectively, 
numbering approximately 250,000 people within 
the region in total. This group is scattered over 
the peninsula, and constitute a numerical 
minority lower than 30 per cent in either of its 
rural districts and urban settlements. 
The Crimean Tatar movement for 
repatriation (in 1989 institutionalized as the 
Organization of the Crimean Tatar National 
Movement) in 1991 established the Crimean 
Tatar representative bodies and non-territorial 
self-government. The core of this system is the 
Congress (Qurultay, as spelled in the Crimean 
Tatar language) elected in theory by all Crimean 
Tatars and their family members either resident 
in Ukraine or being citizens of Ukraine. The 
Qurultay is composed of 250 members elected 
since 2013 by a direct vote upon a mixed 
majoritarian - proportional scheme and before 
2013 in two stages first by the Crimean Tatar 
voters and then by electors’ conferences. The 
Qurultay is to convene at least once in 2.5 years; 
it is considered the highest representative organ 
and can consider and make decision on all issues 
concerning Crimean Tatars. The Qurultay in 
turn elects the permanent body, the Mejlis (the 
original spelling is Meclis) composed of 33 
Qurultay delegates; it is subject to the Qurultay 
and functions between the Qurultay’s sessions. 
The Qurultay and Mejlis in combination of 23 
regional and more than 200 local Qurultays and 
Mejlises serve as a system of political 
representation and self-governance
20
. While the 
Qurultay and Mejlis claim their all-national 
representative status they remain just one, but 
the most influential movement of the Crimean 
Tatars.
21
 There are also other, less weighty 
Crimean Tatar political organizations (the total 
number of Crimean Tatar NGOs by 2010 was 
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close to 100)
22
 and even radical Islamic groups 
acting underground.  
Since its establishment in 1991, the 
Qurultay claims, first, that Crimean Tatars as the 
only indigenous people in the peninsula (taken 
together with tiny ‘indigenous’ ethnicities of 
Karaims and Krymchaks) must have the 
exclusive right of self-determination and thus be 
entitled to define the political status of Crimea 
notwithstanding their minority position.
23
 In 
making this claim, the Qurultay refers to 
international law and the instruments concerning 
indigenous peoples and their collective rights. 
Among the short-range demands of the Crimean 
Tatar leaders have been quotas for Crimean 
Tatar recruitment into the Crimea’s 
representative and administrative organs on all 
levels ranging from 33 to 50 per cent of all 
positions.
24
  Since the Qurultay and its leaders 
evade any clear explanations of what form the 
Crimean Tatars rule over the population 
consisting of other ethnicities might take and by 
what means it can be established,
25
 this feeds 
suspicion and distrust among the local policy-
makers and the population at large. Moreover, 
the claim of the Crimean Tatars to exclusive 
indigenous status precludes durable coalitions 
between the Tatars and other formerly deported 
groups in Crimea. Another key claim of the 
Qurultay is that it shall be regarded to be the 
only one legitimate representative organ of 
Crimean Tatars with a special public status and 
entitlements. For this reason, the Qurultay and 
Mejlis have always rejected official 
incorporation as non-governmental 
organizations. The authorities of Ukraine never 
accepted both claims until the full loss of the 
control over Crimea, but have in fact cooperated 
with the Crimean Tatar movement since early 
1990s.
26
 The latter was the only really pro-
Ukrainian mass political movement in Crimea.  
In fact, the Ukrainian government has 
striven to use the Crimean Tatar movement, but 
has done very little to convince the Crimean 
Tatars that strategically they had substantive 
reasons to be loyal to the Ukrainian state. The 
social and educational programmes launched by 
the Ukrainian government for the repatriates 
have been widely criticized as insufficient.
27
 
This can be to a large extent explained by the 
country’s economic troubles. The ARC 
authorities have also engaged in the 
accommodation of repatriates, and their 
contribution has been comparable with what has 
been done by the Kiev government.  
The Ukrainian Law on the rehabilitation 
of the repressed people has been adopted too late 
- on 17 April 2014 - while the 1991 national 
Law on individual victims of political 
repressions has offered only symbolic benefits 
and compensations. Until April 2014 there were 
no positive official reactions to the Mejlis’s 
demands of a special law on Crimean Tatars or 
indigenous peoples of Ukraine in general. The 
Ukrainian government has been also hesistant to 
recognize the Qurultay and the Mejlis as public 
bodies. However, in 1999 the Mejlis was granted 
indirect recognition as a consultative Council on 
the Crimean Tatar issue under the Ukrainian 
President. The Council was not functional after 
2005, and in 2010 was replaced by another body 
composed of people representatives of different 
currents among the Crimean Tatars.
28
 On top of 
this, the government of Ukraine has done 
nothing to elaborate a workable and durable 
formula of power-sharing that would mitigate 
the potential conflict around the Crimean Tatars 
claims to property restitution and territorial self-
determination. 
2.3. Crimea as an autonomous region 
within Ukraine 
Since 1990 the political and administrative elites 
of Crimea urged territorial autonomy within first 
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the USSR and then Ukraine. The Kiev 
government ultimately rescinded the 1992 and 
1996 Constitutions of Crimea, which envisaged 
in fact a federative arrangement.
29
 In 1998, the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea was endowed 
with a new Constitution and limited 
administrative and budgetary but not legislative 
competences. The ARC was allowed to manage 
such issues as agriculture, environment, urban 
planning, support to local businesses and limited 
social programmes.
30
 The key law enforcement  
officials and judges were appointed from Kiev. 
Ukrainian remained the sole state language 
throughout the country’s territory while Russian, 
the Crimean Tatar and other languages were 
guaranteed ‘functioning, use and protection’ on 
par with Ukrainian. Russian was the language of 
official communication and paperwork, while 
the Crimean Tatar language was the language of 
instruction in 15 schools, also taught in 40 
bilingual schools and used by several media 
outlets.
31
 
Although the ARC had a weak 
administrative autonomy with limited and 
unclearly defined competences, the political and 
economic elites of Crimea were generally 
satisfied with the situation. This was the reason 
why in 1992 and 1994 the Crimean elites for the 
most part did not support the local populist 
movements for a wider autonomy and closer ties 
with Russia.
32
  Over years Kiev did not interfere 
in the local affairs, and maintained some 
informal balance in power-sharing between the 
centre and the periphery. This order changed 
under the rule of Victor Yanukovich’s Regions 
Party. While prior to 2010 the key political 
figure in ARC was the chair of its Supreme 
Council who in fact controlled the major 
appointments and administrative decisions, later 
on the actual power shifted to the Council of 
Ministers whose chair, approved by Kiev and 
thus dependent on the Ukrainian presidency, 
kept control over the parliament through the 
Regions Party machinery.
33
 This strategy, 
similar to the policy pursued in other regions of 
Ukraine, led to alienation of the Crimean elites 
from the centre. 
Alienation from Ukraine also concerned 
the Crimean population at large. Ukraine had no 
strategy for the development of Crimea, and too 
many people perceived the Ukrainian rule as a 
period of economic stagnation. Moreover, too 
often the governments in Kiev and prominent 
policy-makers signaled that they regarded the 
Crimean autonomy a threat to Ukraine’s 
integrity and security and a temporary status 
which was to be abolished eventually.
34
  
Crimean Tatars as well as many other 
large segments of the Crimean population might 
have had numerous reasons to be dissatisfied 
with the autonomy and the weak and poor 
Ukrainian statehood at large; nevertheless, they 
lived in a democratic country with free elections 
and multi-party system and could benefit from 
it. Crimean Tatars actively participated in 
Crimean and Ukrainian politics.  
Representatives of the Mejlis were deputies of 
the Ukrainian Parliament (one from 2007 on), of 
the Supreme Council of ARC (six since 2010) 
and of local representative organs. In 2010, the 
number of Crimean Tatar deputies at all levels in 
Crimea and in the Ukrainian parliament reached 
992, or 14 per cent of the total number of elected 
public figures in and from Crimea.
35
  The 
Crimean authorities (although their relations 
with the Mejlis were generally complex and 
often tense) were in principle not hostile to 
power-sharing, and its elements were introduced 
informally. In 1993-98, the Crimean Tatars were 
granted 14 reserved seats at the ARC Supreme 
Council.
36
 The Republican Committee on the 
Nationalities and Deportees Affairs since its 
inception and until 2011 was reserved for 
Crimean Tatar representatives, and Crimean 
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Tatars were often recruited to the positions up to 
vice-premier in the ARC Council of Ministers. 
Crimea’s annexation puts an end to all these 
opportunities. What comes instead? 
3. EXPECTATIONS FOLLOWING 
THE ANNEXATION 
The occupation and annexation took a short 
period of time between 26 February when 
unidentified armed men captured the ARC 
Supreme Council and 21 March 2014 when 
Russia approved its enlargement. Too few 
people in Crimea (among them was a large share 
of Crimean Tatars) protested the occupation, and 
were unable to stop the process. Since March 
2014, the Crimean peninsula is administratively 
divided into two de facto units of the Russian 
Federation – the Republic of Crimea and the city 
of Sevastopol. The new so-called constitution of 
the Republic of Crimea was adopted on 11 April 
2014, and the old representative assemblies of 
ARC and Sevastopol serve as these two regions’ 
legislatures until their re-election scheduled for 
September 2014. All inhabitants of Crimea who 
have not declared a desire to retain their 
Ukrainian citizenship before 18 April 2014 have 
been deemed Russian citizens;
37
 since the 
procedure was not clearly defined and the time 
span for making the choice was too small,
38
 in 
fact this means a compulsory imposition of the 
Russian nationality.  
The Crimean Tatars as well as other 
minorities got mixed messages. On the one 
hand, several Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar 
activists were kidnapped or beaten up and one 
person was murdered under unclear 
circumstances; there were no opportunities to 
agitate against the merger with Russia, and local 
journalists opposing the annexation were 
intimidated.
39
 On the other hand, the separatist 
officials and envoys of the Russian government 
were giving generous, but unclear promises to 
Crimean Tatars. The statements concerned 
establishment of quotas and reserved seats for 
Crimean Tatars; official status and institutional 
guarantees to the Crimean Tatar language; 
rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars as a 
formerly deported people, and official 
acknowledgement of the Qurultay. In addition, 
there was the willingness of Russian officials to 
communicate directly with the Crimean Tatar 
leaders. For instance, the President of Tatarstan 
Rustam Minnikhanov visited Crimea and 
directly addressed the March session of 
Qurultay.
40
 The former President of Tatarstan 
Mintimer Shaimiev had a meeting with the first 
chair of the Qurultay (in 1991-2013), the 
nowadays informal leader of the Crimean Tatars 
and a member of the Ukrainian Parliament 
Mustafa Djemilev; Djemilev also had a 
telephone conversation with the Russian 
President Vladimir Putin on the latter’s 
initiative.
41
  
By 11 April, no legal framework for the 
Crimean Tatars’ accommodation had been 
specified, save established. The treaty on the 
incorporation of Crimea into the Russian 
Federation of 18 March 2014 refers to the 
‘peoples of Crimea’ in plural, stipulates that the 
Crimean Tatar language will be a state language 
on par with Russian and Ukrainian,
42
 and 
guarantees the ‘development of native 
languages’ to all peoples of Crimea.43 The 
Russian Federal Constitutional Law on Crimea’s 
incorporation of 21 March 2014 refers to the the 
Crimean Tatar language as one of the state 
languages of the Republic of Crimea along with 
Russian and Ukrainian.
44
 Besides, a Resolution 
of Crimea’s Supreme Council (de facto 
parliament) of 11 March 2014 on the rights of 
Crimean Tatars promises the recognition of the 
Crimean Tatar language as a state language in 
the future constitution; guarantees representation 
of the Crimean Tatar language in all branches 
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and levels of government including a 20 per cent 
quota for the regional executive bodies; 
recognition of the Qurultay and its organs; 
targeted support of the Crimean Tatar 
educational and cultural institutions; social and 
economic rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars as a 
formerly deported people.
45
  
It was not a big surprise that in March the 
Crimean Tatar leaders were hesitant about their 
future mode of behavior. On the one hand, they 
protested the annexation and called their 
constituency for retaining their Ukrainian 
citizenship. On the other hand, the Qurultay 
agreed in principle to collaborate with the new 
de facto authorities and delegated two people as 
the Crimean Tatar representatives in the 
Crimean government.
46
 At the same time, the 
Qurultay declared its willingness to seek a 
‘national-territorial statehood’ of Crimean Tatars 
in accordance with the Russian model,
47
 but also 
announced the referendum to be held among 
Crimean Tatars on the issue of Crimea’s status,48 
and this motion definitely contradicts Russia’s 
legislation. 
It is clear that the Crimean Tatars are 
confronting a complex, multi-layered and 
effective repressive machinery. What can the 
new authorities do beyond this in a positive 
sense, in terms of establishing a special 
protective regime for the Crimean Tatars and of 
facilitating their participation in the peninsula’s 
public life and governance? 
The question looked much clearer after 11 
April 2014 when the State Council of the 
Republic of Crimea (the re-branded Supreme 
Council of ARC) adopted the so-called 
constitution of the Republic of Crimea. No 
consultations with Crimean Tatar organizations 
took place in the course of drafting, and the 
previous promises given to Crimean Tatars have 
not been taken into account. The only provision 
directly related to Crimean Tatars in the so-
called Crimean constitution concerns the official 
status of the Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean 
Tatar languages. Thus, the direction of the 
further development is generally clear. The 
tentative answer to the question asked in the 
previous paragraph might sound as ‘not more 
than in any other region of Russia’. So far one 
cannot talk literally about a legal framework for 
the protection of Crimean Tatars, but can expect 
the application of Russia’s model for diversity 
management in Crimea.  
What can the Crimean Tatars en masse 
and the Qurultay in particular count on in terms 
of Russian legislation and the established 
patterns of governance? First, this is a model in 
many respects different from the Ukrainian one: 
it envisages more governmental control and 
interference, more restrictions but also more 
direct and indirect allocations for the officially 
authorized activities. One should keep in mind 
that in the Russian case all official declarations 
and even legislative provisions shall not be taken 
on their face value. As a rule, the scope of 
implementation is significantly reduced on the 
road from a law on paper to state action, and too 
many things are dependent on hidden bargaining 
and current political expediency, or, in other 
words, arbitrary decisions of the superior 
authorities. At the same time, the Russian 
authorities in many cases demonstrate a 
remarkable flexibility and readiness to go far 
beyond their own laws if the situation so 
warrants. Last but not least is that it is still 
unclear what strategy the Qurultay and its 
leaders will follow. Nevertheless, we can project 
the major organizational setups and patterns of 
the Russian ethno-politics onto Crimea and 
tentatively access their applicability. 
4. FUTURE DANGERS 
Crimea has been de facto transferred from a 
politically unstable and poor but democratic 
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state to a country with an authoritarian over-
centralized government, fake multi-party 
system, massive state-sponsored propaganda 
campaigns, effective repressive machinery and 
no such luxuries as freedom of speech, fair and 
transparent elections or independent judiciary. 
Within the limits of an Issue Brief, I can only list 
the major risks an independent ethnicity-based 
movement with political claims contradicting the 
government’s stances will face in Russia without 
going too far into the description of the practices 
and their formal underpinnings. The risks of 
pressure, intimidation and persecutions can be 
systematized in several different ways.  
There can be legal (i.e. staying in line 
with the Russian secondary law in force
49
) or 
illegal (contradicting even the written law, but 
routinely practiced) forms of pressure. The latter 
range from physical assaults on civil activists by 
unidentified persons to interference in private 
life, illegal videotaping or interception of private 
communications with their further publication. 
Both activities are never properly investigated. 
The most often mode of illegal persecution is 
falsification of criminal cases, and the primary 
victims are businesspeople who can be accused 
of ‘fraud’ for any kind of deal; for example, if 
the public prosecutor finds the price ‘artificially 
high’. Planting drugs on the detainees with a 
subsequent criminal accusation as well as 
persecution for allegedly ‘counterfeit software’ 
are also widely practiced. Therefore, activists 
and private sponsors of oppositional activities 
are in the most vulnerable position. Illegal 
firings of employees from public or private 
enterprises or expulsion of students from higher 
educational institutions could also be put on the 
list here. 
The law in effect provides for numerous 
opportunities to put pressure on individuals and 
organizations on quasi-legal grounds, and the 
consequences may vary from moral damage to 
closure of an organization and criminal 
persecutions.  
Pressure on individuals can be first and 
foremost done through the so-called anti-
extremist legislation. The latter includes the core 
federal law ‘On the counteraction to extremist 
activities’50 and several provisions of the 
Criminal Code and other sectoral laws. The 
mentioned federal law adopted in 2002 and 
amended many times offers an excessively 
broad definition of the terms ‘extremism’ and 
‘extremist activities’ introduced as full 
synonyms. The meaning range from terrorist 
attacks to intolerant statements about ethnic, 
religious and other groups; and from violent 
actions against the state to the incitement of 
national, racial, religious and social enmity in 
connection with violence or threats of violence. 
Since July 2006, the definition of ‘extremism’ 
also includes discrimination.  
This variety of (mis)deeds is subject to 
criminal and administrative punishment. 
However, the broad and blurry definition and the 
long list of prohibited activities mean that the 
choice of who is and who is not an ‘extremist’ 
has become completely discretionary, giving the 
authorities the opportunity to accuse of 
extremism every opponent and any group they 
dislike; the so-called struggle against extremism 
is a widely used ploy to intimidate and suppress 
unwanted groups or organizations.
51
 
One could also mention several deeds 
which are also criminally persecuted in the 
Russian Federation and which the Russian law 
enforcement can easily find in the current and 
future activities of the Crimean Tatar or any 
other ethnic organizations. On top of the list is 
so-called ‘fuelling of ethnic, racial or religious 
hatred’ (Art. 282 of the Russian Criminal Code). 
In practice it is defined broadly - for example, 
public grievances about the state of minority 
languages can be also qualified as ‘fuelling 
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hatred’.52 Moreover, one could add ‘public 
appeals to extremist activities’ (Art.280; 
although not all of those ‘extremist activities’ 
are criminally liable); ‘public appeals to the 
violation of the country’s territorial integrity’ 
(Art.280.1; in force from 9 May 2014); 
‘establishment of an extremist community’ 
(Art.282.1); ‘organization of an extremist 
association’ (Art. 282.2; this implies 
participation in an organization closed down and 
banned because of its allegedly ‘extremist’ 
activities). One shall not also forget about 
Art.275 which defines ‘state treason’ incredibly 
broadly, as all kinds of collaboration with 
foreign or international organizations which do 
harm (even unwittingly) to the ‘external security 
of the Russian Federation’.  
Individuals, particularly businesspeople, 
can be intimidated in many other ways, and this 
is what regularly happens to those who 
demonstrate their disloyalty to the authorities. 
The main threat for the entrepreneurs is checks 
done by numerous inspectorates (the taxation 
service, fire departments, public health services 
and so forth). Each check can paralyze the 
business for a long time even if it does not entail 
direct fines.  
According to the ‘anti-extremist’ 
legislation, mass media outlets and civil society 
organizations can be suspended or closed down 
under a simplified procedure,
53
 while internet 
websites can be blocked without any court 
decision. According to the amendments to the 
Law on information and information 
technologies made on 23 April 2014, all web-
resources which have more 3,000 visits per day 
will be registered as periodicals and thus subject 
to the respective legislation which envisaged 
state control and sanctions. Each civil society 
organization which somehow affects public 
opinion and gets funding from abroad, is obliged 
to register as a ‘foreign agent’, that entails 
regular checks and burdensome reporting 
procedures; a refusal to register leads to criminal 
persecution of the organization’s  staff.54 Even if 
a certain organization is not fined or suspended, 
official checks as such can be devastating. An 
official suspicion of ‘extremist activities’ is 
often used as a pretext to confiscate the entire 
circulations of newspapers, brochures or leaflets 
for the ‘pre-investigation checks’. Finally, public 
protests such as rallies and picketing are in fact 
banned and are to be criminally liable soon.  
Besides, the new authorities can make 
pressure on wide segments of the population, 
particularly, on the Qurultay constituency, in 
order to make the Crimean Tatar leaders more 
pliable.  Some people may be denied citizenship 
on the pretext that they have no residence 
registration in Crimea. Although the Russian 
Federal Migration Service stated that the 
recognition of Russian citizenship will be done 
upon actual permanent residence and not 
necessarily administrative registration,
55
 these 
promises may mean nothing while residence 
registration has always been a condition for the 
acknowledgment of citizenship in Russia. At 
best, people may be sent to a court to prove the 
fact of their residence. At worst, the authorities 
can contest the legality of certain people’s 
citizenship afterwards on the pretext that the 
papers were processed improperly; and this is 
what happened to tens of thousands of people in 
Russia in early 2000s.
56
 People may also be 
subject to mass and regular checks of their 
identity papers and residence registration and 
subsequent fines if any disorder is disclosed. 
This is the way that the Meskhetian Turks were 
forced out of the Krasnodar region in the 1990s-
2000s.
57
 Some can be fined for ‘illegal 
construction’ or evicted if the new authorities do 
not recognize their ownership rights of their real 
estate. Last but not least, holders of Ukrainian or 
other (Uzbek, Tadjik) passports may be denied 
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residence permits or the right to enter Crimea, 
given that the procedure for the issuance of 
residence permits for these people already living 
in the region has not been defined so far. A clear 
signal was sent on 19 April when the border 
authorities in Crimea banned the Ukrainian MP 
and an informal leader of the Crimean Tatars 
Mustafa Djemilev to enter the Russian territory 
until April 2019.
58
 Re-registration of businesses 
and NGOs may also pose a problem for all, and 
particularly for those who are deemed disloyal to 
the new rule.  
Three circumstances are to be mentioned 
as well. First, there are no reasons to rely on the 
judiciary - the courts as a rule when the case 
concerns a conflict between the state and a 
private person or a non-governmental 
organization, defend the state and pay little 
attention to the law.  Second, there is no clear 
boundary between official and unofficial 
pressure and intimidation.
59
 Third, pressure and 
intimidation are not necessarily exercised upon 
direct and clear orders coming from the 
administrative top – many things derive from 
local initiatives. 
5. POSITIVE EXPECTATIONS? 
5.1. Territorial Autonomy  
The Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol are de 
facto two constituent units
60
 of the Russian 
Federation which are equal with the other 83 
regions before the federal government. Russia’s 
constituent regions are formally divided into six 
types, and many people even scholars share the 
stereotype that three types of these six - 21 
republics, one autonomous province and four 
autonomous districts - shall be regarded as 
ethnicity-based entities.
61
 However, the ethnic 
profile of these regions is not defined in the 
federal constitution and the federal legislation; 
the regional constitutions and laws also lack any 
clear provisions on the status of and guarantees 
to their ‘titular’ ethnicities.  
Even though some federation units take 
the name of their ‘titular’ ethnic group, neither 
the constitution nor the federal legislation 
explicitly define the republics, autonomous 
districts and the autonomous province as entities 
established on ethnic grounds. A few federal 
laws such as the Law on national-cultural 
autonomy of 1996 contain the formulation of 
‘citizens residing outside their national-state 
entities’, but the latter is not clarified and entails 
no legal consequences; neither does the law 
allow for special treatment of the ‘titular’ 
groups. No references to ethnicity can be found 
in the major laws concerning the structure of the 
federation and the vertical division of powers. 
At the regional level, the constitutions and 
charters of republics and autonomous districts 
often contain ambiguous expressions and 
internal contradictions that are open to widely 
different legal interpretations. There is no 
uniform model that describes the link between 
ethnicity and the territory, and in some cases the 
legislation omits any references to such 
connections.
62
 For example, the preamble to the 
1994 constitution of Tatarstan states that the 
constitution expresses ‘the will of the multi-
national people of the Republic of Tatarstan and 
the Tatar people’, whereas according to Art. 1, 
part 1, ‘the holder of sovereignty and the only 
source of political power in the Republic of 
Tatarstan is its multi-national people’. The 
constitution of the Republic of Sakha contains 
no references to the Yakut ethnicity; it uses the 
term ‘national-state status’ (Chapter 3), but 
declares that the republic’s population, 
consisting of citizens of all nationalities, is the 
source of state power and that no one segment of 
the population can usurp the right to exercise 
such power (Art. 1, part 4). 
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According to some regional constitutions 
and charters, the respective governments are 
obliged to support the language and culture of 
particular groups. However, this obligation is 
always unspecified; besides, such provisions 
appear in the constitutions and charters of some 
constituent republics and autonomous districts, 
but not in others. Regional laws of the republics 
do not contain more specific definitions. Thus, 
to sum up, in the formal sense there are no clear 
constitutional or legal provisions in Russia 
establishing any tangible legal link between 
specific ‘titular’ groups and the administrative 
units to which these groups belong. The only 
real legal guarantee is the right of the republics 
to establish their own state languages on par 
with Russian.  
It remains highly questionable that 
Russian federalism in fact provides an 
institutional framework for the collective 
organization, participation and social 
development along ethnic lines as well as for the 
redistribution of resources in favour of ethnic 
groups allegedly dominating certain federation 
units. Even if such privileged access to resources 
and to participation in public life manifests 
itself, it might be questioned that it is a direct 
outcome of the ethnicity-based territorial 
structure. The most important point here is also 
the lack of a clear correlation between the legal 
provisions defining the status and the institutions 
of the republics, the autonomous province and 
autonomous districts and their respective 
domestic policies. Just as in the legal domain 
there is no uniform model in political and social 
life. Across the federation there are multiple 
ways in which ethnic or linguistic differences 
materialize in public space; there are no uniform 
political or social policies aimed at ‘titular’ 
ethnicities. The governmental support of the 
‘titular’ ethnicities in the Russian republics 
depends on the political preferences of their 
governments and many other circumstances and 
varies significantly from region to region. 
Languages other than Russian are taught in 
schools and are present in mass media, but 
generally play a marginal role in the public 
space.
63
 There is no reason to expect that the 
Republic of Crimea will be functioning 
differently. 
5.2. Non-territorial Autonomy  
In some way, the Qurultay and Mejlis can be 
regarded as bottom-up territorial arrangement. 
Can they be incorporated into the Russian legal 
system? The Crimean Tatar leaders rejected the 
idea of registering their representative organs as 
NGOs with the Ukrainian authorities, and there 
are no reasons so far to expect that they will 
change their position under the Russian rule. 
Ethnic and regional political parties on ethnic 
grounds are not allowed in Russia, and non-
political NGOs can barely be effective either in 
influencing politics or providing services to the 
populace.  
Russia has special legislation on ‘national 
cultural autonomy’ (NCA), and Crimean Tatar 
activists can establish local, regional or federal 
organizations with the status of ‘autonomies’ 
(this word is used as a noun in the Russian law). 
In practical terms, that makes little sense 
because NCAs are merely NGOs with restricted 
rights and very complex incorporation 
procedures.
64
  
NCAs in Russia are a type of civil society 
organization; they are set up on behalf of an 
ethnic group in a position of a national minority 
within a respective territory; only mono-ethnic 
NCAs are allowed. NCAs may have three levels 
of territorial organization; in other words, there 
can be local (within a municipality), regional 
(within a federation unit) and all-Russian 
‘autonomies’.  
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The procedures for the establishment of 
an NCA are more complex than for other types 
of non-governmental organizations. NCAs can 
be set up only on a bottom-up basis: a group of 
persons belonging to a certain ethnicity can 
establish a local NCA; several local NCAs can 
form a regional one; in turn several regional 
NCAs can establish a federal ‘autonomy’. In 
theory, Crimean Tatars of the Republic of 
Crimea and Sevastopol can first incorporate 
locally, and then establish two regional NCAs 
and then one federal NCA of their own. The 
only practical reason for doing this is getting a 
seat in a consultative body on NCA affairs with 
the Russian Ministry of Regional Development. 
The rights of NCAs are restricted in 
comparison with ‘ordinary’ NGOs which can 
also be ethnicity-based; only one organizational 
form based on fixed individual membership is 
possible, and NCAs are allowed to carry out 
activities related exclusively to the issues of 
language, culture and education. Like ‘ordinary’ 
social organizations, NCAs can establish mass-
media outlets, cultural and educational 
institutions, own property and conclude 
contracts. NCAs, like other ethnic non-
governmental organizations in Russia receive a 
small-scale support from public authorities and 
only a few can rely on regular private 
sponsorship. 
What might be more realistic and 
practically relevant for the Russian authorities in 
terms of durable organizational setting, would be 
transforming the Qurultay into a ‘people’s 
congress’. The authorities of several Russian 
republics including Tatarstan facilitate and fund 
publicly elected ‘congresses’ of their titular 
ethnicities and their permanent governing 
bodies.
65
 Being merely NGOs under the Russian 
law and lacking any specific legal framework, 
these ‘congresses’ function, on the one hand, as 
agents of the state (governmental NGOs – 
GONGOS, to be precise), on the other hand, as a 
lobbying device for the elites of the respective 
ethnic groups and as a channel of 
communication and bargaining with the 
authorities.  
5.3. The status of an indigenous people 
Russia has legislation on ‘small indigenous 
peoples’, but it cannot apply in case of Crimean 
Tatars because there is a numerical threshold 
(not more than 50,000 people).
66
 Besides, the 
law aims at protecting populaces with 
‘traditional economics and lifestyle’. For a 
variety of reasons, one can hardly expect the 
adoption of either a federal or a regional law on 
the status of Crimean Tatars. 
5.4. Guaranteed representation 
A sort of power-sharing was informally 
observed in several republics of the North 
Caucasus during Soviet times. The Crimean de 
facto authorities can reserve (at least informally) 
certain official positions for Crimean Tatars as 
promised in the Crimean Supreme Council’s 
declaration of 11 March 2014. As mentioned 
above, this practice is not unfamiliar to Crimea: 
there were reserved seats for minorities in the 
local parliament in 1993-98, and certain 
positions in the executive were routinely 
allocated to Crimean Tatars. Only one Russian 
region – Dagestan – had a system of formally 
institutionalized and legally guaranteed power-
sharing. It included a collective Presidency – the 
State Council – composed of 14 people 
representing the major ethnicities of the 
Republic and a mixed electoral system where 
certain territorial electoral districts with 
ethnically mixed constituencies were designated 
to candidates of certain ethnicities.
67
 The latter 
setting secured proportionate representation in 
the regional parliament and also curtailed inter-
ethnic competition in politics. However, the 
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system was abolished in 2002-06 in the course 
of eliminating all institutional arrangements in 
Russia which made minority ethnicities salient 
in public space.
68
 Legal institutionalization of 
power-sharing in Crimea would be in sharp 
contrast with this clear trend in Russian politics. 
Preferential recruitment of Crimean Tatars into 
the Crimean legislature and the administration 
can take place, but one might legitimately expect 
that it will resemble a tokenism, achieved only 
upon individual decisions made in a non-
transparent way at the top of regional or federal 
executives in exchange for political loyalty. 
5.5. Rehabilitation of a formerly 
deported people 
Russia has two separate laws of 1991 on the 
rehabilitation of ethnic groups as collective 
entities as well as on individual victims, which 
were repressed during Soviet time.
69
 In theory, 
Crimea Tatars have been subject to both acts 
because in 1944 Crimea was a part of Russia. In 
practice, Crimean residents were not able to 
benefit from them, while even within the 
Russian jurisdiction both offer very little. The 
Law on the ‘repressed peoples’ envisages 
adoption of special normative acts on each of the 
repressed people and then special target 
measures for the facilitation of cultural and 
educational institutions. In 1990s, there were 
enacted either resolutions of the parliament (on 
Koreans, Ingrian Finns and Cossacks) or decrees 
of the President (on Germans, Karachais, 
Kalmyks, Balkars and also Cossacks) which 
declared the given communities under the 
process of rehabilitation, listed the general 
opportunities for the victims already enshrined 
in the legislation and authorized the Government 
to take concrete measures for the support and 
‘development’ of the respective groups. The four 
federal programmes launched in 1990s on the 
basis of these framework acts turned out to be 
limited in scale and inefficient.
70
 At the moment, 
the Russian government follows the same 
strategy with regard to Crimea: the Kremlin 
announced President Putin’s framework decree 
on the rehabilitation of the Crimean formerly 
deported ethnicities, and this means that the next 
step will be a governmental programme for 
additional infrastructure investments in 
Crimea.
71
 With regard to the law on individual 
victims, it offers some social benefits (such as 
tax exemptions and reduced travel fares) for the 
imprisoned or exiled people and their family 
members as well as pecuniary compensations 
which are merely symbolic and cannot exceed 
the amount of approximately 350 U.S. dollars 
per person. 
5.6. Language policy and public support 
to cultural and educational 
institutions 
The federal and regional governments are 
generally expected to support minority 
languages and culture under the law, and they 
provide some funding to public and private 
educational and cultural institutions serving 
minorities. The official obligations in this area 
are not, however, clearly defined, are not 
directly enforceable and are fully dependent on 
the government’s discretion. In general, the 
principle of ‘narrowing funnel’ applies: the 
state’s obligations are being gradually reduced 
on the way from general declarations and 
constitutional provisions to implementation 
through a series of laws, executive programs and 
individual decisions of the executive. The only 
real guarantee of implementation is the good 
will of the executive; no action can be taken in 
court on the grounds of declarations, concepts 
and programmes on ethnic relations, and the 
executive branch has a wide margin of 
appreciation in interpreting laws and in broader 
decision-making.  
 ECMI- Issue Brief # 32 
 
 
16 | P a g e  
 
There is another, still fully neglected issue 
– the script. According to Art.3, part 6 of the 
1991 Russian Federation Law “On Languages in 
the Russian Federation” (as amended in 2002), 
the state languages of republics within Russia 
can use only Cyrillic script if the otherwise is 
not stipulated by a federal law. The Crimean 
Tatar language is written both in Cyrillic and 
Latin alphabets, and in 1997 the ARC Supreme 
Council approved Latin script for official use. 
The Qurultay and Mejlis as well as the Internet 
in the Crimean Tatar language use Latin script, 
while printed media in the Crimean Tatar 
language is partly in Cyrillic and partly in Latin. 
The Russian law does not regulate language use 
in private communications and in non-
governmental organizations, but mass media and 
schools must be subject to language regulations 
concerning the scripts. 
Last but not least – Russia has no anti-
discrimination legislation, and the prospects for 
its adoption are negligible. 
6. CONCLUSION  
In a formal sense, Russian rule in Crimea does 
not promise the Crimean Tatars much more than 
they already had in Ukraine, but puts them at 
risk of a strict police control and pressure. The 
general strategy of the Russian authorities will 
likely be aimed at curbing and suppressing any 
unauthorized activities on ethnic as well as any 
other grounds in Crimea. For this purpose, one 
may anticipate attempts to sweep away or 
marginalize disloyal leaders and activists while 
at the same time to co-opt, put under control and 
support whose who wish to collaborate with the 
new rulers on the imposed conditions. The latter 
seems feasible because few Crimean Tatar 
leaders would like to engage their people in a 
new round of troubles after almost 50-years in 
exile and because some Crimean Tatars activists 
(leaders of the ‘Milli Firka’ party, for example72) 
already swore allegiance to the new authorities. 
Moreover, the Russian domestic legislation, 
which is vaguely formulated and open to 
interpretation, can barely be a point of reference 
here. Too many will be dependent on purely 
political decisions made in Moscow and to a 
lesser extent by the Crimean de facto 
government and law-makers. Keeping in mind 
the major patterns of Russian ethnic policies, 
one may predict that material and symbolic 
rewards will be granted in exchange for political 
loyalty and stability. Moreover, the Russian 
ethno-cultural management goes far beyond a 
simple combination of sticks and carrots for 
ethnic activists. It relies on a complex technique 
of incorporating ethnic activists into patron-
client networks as well as institutionalizing and 
shaping communications and public 
deliberations on ethnic issues in a way that 
brackets out unwanted public figures and 
agendas. The Russian government may allocate 
a great deal of money for the cultural and 
educational programmes serving Crimean Tatars 
and other ethnicities or refrain from doing this, 
and no one will have a leverage to make the 
authorities fulfil their promises or secure any 
guarantees. 
Some Crimean Tatar leaders may pursue a 
flexible but independent strategy and, on the one 
hand, try to avoid political confrontation and 
official reprisals while, on the other hand, strive 
to defend their constituency’s rights and 
interests as much as possible. All potential 
scenarios mean a strong pressure on the Crimean 
Tatars, and this makes international support and 
solidarity vitally important. Finally, the 
conclusions are applicable to other ethnicities in 
Crimea.
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